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This paper examines the long-run performance of French initial public offerings (IPOs) carried out between
1991 and 2005. Using various methodologies, we found that IPOs in our sample performed poorly relative
to the comparison portfolios over the 1991–2005 horizon in contrast to that reported by prior studies of
the French market. This abnormal long-run performance is more severe for orphan IPOs (those without
financial analysts’ recommendations) than for non-orphan IPOs the first year following the offerings (a
statistically significant difference). In contrast to the widely held belief, this evidence suggests that analyst
coverage is indeed not important to the issuing firm. Investors pay more attention to non-orphan IPOs when
they are not book built, venture capital backed, underwritten by a large syndicate and less underpriced.
Over the 1991–2005 period, an analyst’s affiliation does not appear to matter. This result is inconsistent
with the conflict of interest hypothesis. During the first year of issuance, analysts’ recommendations are
associated with the success of a newly public firm. However, once we extend the horizon to 3 or 5 years
after the issuance, we can find that analysts’ recommendations are not significantly related to the long-run
performance of IPOs.
Keywords: initial public offerings; financial analyst; long-run performance
1. Introduction
The last decade of crisis has been turbulent for analysts’ research. During the internet bubble
period (1999–2000), the media and investors pressured analysts to focus on the ‘hot’ industries.
In every bull market, there are excesses that become apparent in contrast with the subsequent bear
market. Therefore, in 2001 (when the internet bubble burst), investors needed to blame somebody,
and analysts were the scapegoats. Both regulators and the financial press have pointed out that the
analysts’ research was tainted by conflicts of interest, and the academic literature has revealed that
analysts were biased towards providing favourable reports, to the detriment of their objectivity and
reputation. From 1998 to 2001, an ‘all-star’ analyst issued 16 buy recommendations for Global
Crossing. The stock was 61$ in 1999 and had collapsed to approximately 1$ in 2001, when the
analyst finally revised his rating from buy to hold. Of the 10 firms that he covered, 5 traded below
1$ a share and 3 had filed for bankruptcy.
Based on this report, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer pointed out the performance
of such recommendations during an institutional investor award dinner in 2002. ‘These are the
institutional investor awards, and thus reflect criteria important to institutional investors, who prize
analysts’ accessibility, their insights and their ability to uncover a valuable piece of information
∗Corresponding author. Email: rboissin@hotmail.com
ISSN 1351-847X print/ISSN 1466-4364 online
© 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2012.689773
http://www.tandfonline.com
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
om
ain
 B
ois
sin
] a
t 0
7:0
2 2
5 J
un
e 2
01
2 
2 R. Boissin and P. Sentis
about a company or sector, and their access to management. What these awards do not measure
is the performance of analysts’ buy, sell and hold recommendations’. ‘… The investing public is
not aware that the awards don’t reflect the performance of your stock recommendations’.
In this study, we investigate the role of financial analysts as interpreters and producers of
information by examining whether their recommendations allow for the reduction of information
asymmetry. Miller (1977) pointed out that as the information is revealed to the market, investors
downgrade their expectations and support the long-run underperformance phenomenon.We expect
that by reducing the information asymmetry, financial analysts’ recommendations would help
investors progressively define the true value of the firm. We focus on the long-run performance of
French initial public offerings (IPOs) made between 1991 and 2005. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to investigate the link between the financial analysts’ recommendations and
the performance of French IPOs over the recent period.
Some French studies have found no abnormal long-run performance (see Degeorge and Derrien
2001). These findings suggest that the French market may be efficient. All the information may
appear in the price, the market may not overprice or underprice certain types of offerings and
the role of financial analysts may be unjustified. Our observation period is large and overlaps the
so-called bubble period that was characterised by strong information asymmetry. We analyse the
long-run performance from 1 to 5 years following the IPOs.
We measure the influence of the financial analysts’ recommendations on the long-run perfor-
mance of IPOs over a 5-year horizon. Thus, we are able to observe the adjustment of long-run
performance to recommendation disclosures. We are interested in the added value of the analyst
coverage, and we then make the relevant distinction between orphan IPOs (those without analyst
coverage within 5 years of their issuance) and non-orphan IPOs (those with analyst coverage
within 5 years of their issuance).This methodology differs from that of Bradley et al. (2008b),
which focuses on the IPOs that received research coverage.
In contrast to previous studies, we found significant long-run underperformance exhibited by
French IPOs over a 2- to 5-year horizon. This finding reinforces the importance of investigating
the role of financial analysts in the long-run IPO performance puzzle, and it can be partly attributed
to the inclusion of recent IPOs which underperform strongly.
Significant differences appear between the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan
IPOs. For example, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the first year following an IPO
are a significant −11.41% for orphans compared with an insignificant 4.29% for non-orphans
(a difference that is statistically significant). Further analysis revealed that this outperformance
exhibited by non-orphans stems from high coverage.
Finally, our results are robust after conditioning for venture capital backing, bookbuild-
ing method, underwriting syndicate, underpricing, analyst affiliation or operating performance
variables.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we analyse the existing literature to define our
hypothesis. In Section 3, we describe the methodology, data and sample statistics. In Section 4,
we present our findings, and in Section 5, we present the conclusions.
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development
2.1 Can analyst coverage reduce the IPO underperformance phenomenon?
Analysts’ recommendations are valuable for several reasons. Analyst coverage can generate pub-
licity for the IPO and increase firm value by generating more customers (Cliff and Denis 2004).
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As Chen and Ritter (2000) and Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argued, recommenda-
tions can boost share price, which is important for insiders wishing to sell their shares at the
end of the lock-up period. Academic research has pointed out the importance of analyst cov-
erage over the years. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) suggested that the most important
motivation for firms to switch underwriters between an IPO and a seasoned equity offering is
obtaining additional and influential analyst coverage. Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and
Denis (2004) argued that the underpricing of newly public firms is positively related to analyst
coverage. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), the average underpricing of IPOs was 7%
in the 1980s and doubled to 15% during 1990–1998, before jumping to 65% during the internet
bubble. Part of this increase can be attributed to analyst coverage, which has become important
over the years. Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) showed that the number of managing under-
writers in a syndicate is a good indicator of both which firms are likely to have coverage and
which firms will have multiple coverage. Corwin and Schultz (2005) examined syndicates for
1638 IPOs and found evidence that each additional co-manager results in 0.8 additional analyst
issuing recommendations within 3 months of the IPO.
Many other variables have been shown to influence the long-run performance of IPOs. Brav
and Gompers (1997) found that IPOs with venture capital backing outperform non-venture
capital-backed IPOs. Venture capitalists provide potential future investment banking business
to underwriters. Therefore, analysts make favourable recommendations to keep venture capital-
ists happy. Jain and Kini (2000) found that venture capital-backed IPOs are characterised by
greater analyst coverage. Degeorge, Derrien, and Womack (2007) found that book-built issues
were more likely to be followed and positively recommended by financial analysts. Their results
show a clear link between the IPO method and analyst coverage. Rajan and Servaes (1997) and
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argued that underpricing attracts an analyst follow-
ing. Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) and Corwin and Schultz (2005) found that having an
underwriting syndicate is related to research coverage.
Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006) examined analyst coverage and found that unexpected analyst cov-
erage is positively related to long-run performance. Bradley et al. (2008b) did not find incremental
coverage to be related to improved long-run performance. Bradley et al. (2004) focused on the
2-year (at the end of the IPO’s quiet period) post-issue performances of IPOs that receive analyst
coverage and those that do not. The authors found that orphans significantly underperformed the
non-orphans during the 1996–1998 period.
Despite the conventional wisdom that analyst coverage is crucial to an IPO, there is no sys-
tematic evidence for this conclusion. An examination of IPO firm performance with and without
analyst coverage may explain what value has to be attributed to analyst coverage. If financial
analysts reduce information asymmetry and help investors to progressively define the true value
of a firm, then we hypothesise
H1: Non-orphan IPOs may have long-run performance that is superior to that of the orphan IPOs.
2.2 The role of financial analysts
2.2.1 Recommendations have investment value
Analysts both provide new information and interpret previously released information. Most prior
studies have concluded that the information they produce promotes market efficiency by helping
investors to more accurately value companies. One possible source of this value is the ability of
analysts to collect information that is useful for identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks. An
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analyst’s report includes the collection and evaluation of information related to a firm’s future
performance. The analyst obtains information from various sources, including conference calls
and other management communications, general assemblies and financial meetings, and reports
describing macro-economic conditions. From this information, the analyst produces earnings
forecasts, target price, and stock recommendations. Investors use these outputs to make trading
decisions. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) examined analysts’ recommendations in the G7 countries
and evaluated the value of these recommendations over the 1993–2002 period. The authors found
that the frequencies of sell and strong sell recommendations (15.3%) in all the countries were
far less than those of the buy and strong buy recommendations (46.9%). Using a sample of 1126
analysts’ reports, Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) documented that analysts rarely issue sell
or strong sell recommendations. The authors showed that only 0.5% of the recommendations
fall into these two categories. By contrast, 30.8% of the recommendations were classified as
strong buy, 40% as buy, and 28.7% as hold. A reason for the lack of negative recommendations
is that an analyst’s salary and bonus are linked to his or her firm’s underwriting fees or to the
commissions generated by his or her recommendations. Furthermore, analysts rely on company
management for information and thus have a reason for maintaining good relations with them.
Barber et al. (2001) examined whether investors can profit from the analysts’ recommendations
and whether these recommendations remain valuable. Numerous studies have distinguished four
types of recommendations: initiation, reiteration, upgrade, and downgrade. Initiation is defined as
the first report that an analyst produces about a firm. Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008a) showed
that initiation of coverage occurs immediately after the end of the quiet period. Reiteration is
defined as a restatement of a previously issued recommendation. Upgrades and downgrades are
issued when analysts change their position on a stock that they are covering. The authors found
that initiations, on average, elicit positive responses and that there is a large positive (negative)
market reaction associated with upgrades (downgrades). According to Bagchee (2003), the strong
response to both positive and negative revisions is not terribly surprising in the case of IPOs
considering their newness and the lack of public information about them. This study has shown that
downgrades are more likely to occur than upgrades. Irvine (2003) compared the return surrounding
an analyst’s initiation of coverage with the return surrounding a recommendation made by an
analyst who has already covered the stock (a so-called continuation). Using a sample of 2128
analysts’ recommendations over the year 1995, he found that the market responds more positively
to analysts’ initiations than to other recommendations. The market interprets analysts’ initiation as
a positive signal. According to Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003), analysts almost always initiate
coverage with a buy or a strong buy recommendation. This conclusion is consistent with that of
Sayrak and Dhiensiri (2004), who found positive abnormal returns at the time of the initiations.
It appears like the analysts’ recommendations add value for investors. Stock recommendations
are costly for the analysts to provide. These costs include investigation costs and any reputation
costs associated with incorrect recommendations. Finally, according to Houston, James, and
Karceski (2006) and Brav and Lehavy (2003), the market believes that there is some information
in the analysts’ recommendations and the market gives some credence to their recommendations.
If recommendations have investment value, then we hypothesise
H2: Non-orphan IPO performance may be associated with the nature of the recommendations.
2.2.2 The characteristics of financial analysts
All analysts do not have the same access to information. Affiliated analysts (analysts whose
employer is a managing underwriter at the IPO) have superior access to information.As Jegadeesh
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et al. (2004) noted, analysts recommend firms with past strong performances and firms waited to
have good expectations.
It is widely noted that analysts face conflicts of interest.1 Prior studies have documented two
alternative hypothesis (Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999). Under the con-
flict of interest hypothesis, analysts may have to give positive recommendations to compete for
future investment banking business, to generate trading commissions (Hayes 1998; Irvine 2004)
or to maintain management relations and their access to the information (Francis and Philbrick
1993; Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan 1998).2 Under the non-strategic hypothesis, issuers
choose underwriters who are optimistic about their prospects. Using a sample of 391 IPOs in the
USA over the period 1990–1991, Michaely and Womack (1999) found that affiliated analysts’
recommendations perform more poorly than unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations (which is
consistent with the findings of Iskoz (2003) and Houston, James, and Karceski (2006)). Affiliated
analysts issue recommendations that are overly optimistic (positively biased), and these analysts
may be compelled to issue more positive recommendations for firms that have traded poorly in
the IPO aftermarket (consistent with the findings of James and Karceski (2006)). According to
Chen (2004), even though the market reaction to favourable recommendations is less positive
for affiliated analysts, long-run return analyses suggest that analyst affiliation is not significantly
associated with long-run abnormal returns after recommendations.
Michaely and Womack (1999) reported some explanations to understand the affiliation bias.
The first explanation holds that an affiliated analyst believes that the firms that he or she covers
are better than the firms covered by other financial analysts. Therefore, he or she is not able to be
objective and to accept that the firm that he or she recommends does not show exceptional profits.
This explanation reveals an anchor (or overoptimism) bias.
The second explanation holds that an analyst is partly chosen because of the favourable views
that he or she has about a firm. This choice reveals a selection bias in the form of a strategic choice
assuring that the firm will have favourable recommendations. Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000)
examined long-term earnings growth forecasts for seasoned equity offerings and established a
direct link between overoptimistic growth forecasts and post-offering underperformance. Rajan
and Servaes (1997) found that in the long run, IPOs have better stock performance when analysts
ascribe low growth potential rather than high growth potential. However, the authors did not
explain underperformance as a consequence of overoptimistic growth forecasts.
Similar to Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008a), we focused on the market’s performance to
recommendations made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Affiliated recommendations may
be associated with a more positive announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations if the
market views these analysts as having sufficiently superior information or expertise to more than
offset any conflicts of interest.
H3a: Market performance to affiliated recommendations than to unaffiliated recommendations may
be associated with a more positive announcement effect.
Affiliated recommendations may be associated with a less positive announcement effect than
unaffiliated recommendations if the market views these analysts as having a greater conflict of
interest that is not offset by superior information.
H3b: Market performance to affiliated recommendations than to unaffiliated recommendations may
be associated with a less positive announcement effect.
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6 R. Boissin and P. Sentis
Finally, there may be no difference in the announcement effects because the market is naïve
about the differential conflicts of interest.
H3c: Market performance may make no announcement effect distinctions between affiliated and
unaffiliated recommendations.
2.3 Long-run performance of IPOs: some international evidence
Many studies have documented abnormal long-run underperformance 3–5 years after an IPO’s
issue. For example, Ritter (1991) compared the 3-year-horizon performance of 1526 US IPOs
between 1975 and 1984 with that of the IPOs of firms already listed with the same characteristics
(market capitalisation and industry). It appears as though the long-run performance after the
offering was 34.47% compared with 61.86% for the group of matching firms. Ritter emphasised
that underperformance is concentrated in younger companies and hot market periods. Loughran
and Ritter (1995) studied the 5-year-horizon performances of a sample of 4750 US IPOs in the
1970–1990 period. On average, the annual return over 5 years was 5%. The authors found that
investing an equal amount at the same time in a non-issuing firm with approximately the same
market capitalisation returns an average compound of 12%.
This underperformance is mainly explained by irrational investor behaviour in the context of
strong uncertainty. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) found that earnings manipulation by man-
agers at the time of the IPO may be a source of investors’ overoptimism. Similarly, this anomaly
can be explained by the role of underwriters who underprice the IPOs. The strong fluctuations
of shares on the first few days put the firm under the spotlight and attract investors. This effect
creates a short moment of enthusiasm once the fad ends.
The underperformance of IPOs is not a singular phenomenon of the US market. Levis (1993)
focused on IPOs issued in the UK market over the 1980–1988 period. The author found an
underperformance of between −8% and −23% relative to the benchmarks used. Kooli and Suret
(2004) studied the long-run performance of newly public firms in the Canadian market. Their study
revealed a 5-year long-run underperformance of −24.66% for a sample of 445 IPOs between 1991
and 1998.Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez (1993) reported underperformances of −47%, −19.6%,
and −23.7% for IPOs in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, respectively.
These long-run underperformance findings are controversial. Brav and Gompers (1997) argued
that IPO underperformance disappears once book-to-market and size effects are taken into account.
In a sample of 3661 US IPOs between 1935 and 1972, Gompers and Lerner (2003) found underper-
formance when they used the BHAR methodology, although they reported that underperformance
disappeared when they used the cumulative abnormal return methodology. In other words, the
long-run performance of IPOs depends on the method employed.
3. Methodologies, data, and sample statistics
3.1 Methodologies
The results of the long-term performance studies are sensitive to methodological choices. We,
therefore, present our results using two frequently used and recommended methodologies (Barber
and Lyon 1997; Brav and Gompers 1997).
First, we used the calendar-time approach of Fama and French (1996). Their three-factor model
assumes that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [(ERi) − Rf ] is
explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market
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portfolio (RM − Rf), (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the
return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, small minus big), and (iii) the difference between the
return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-
to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio
i is
E(Ri) − Rf = αi + βi[E(RM) − Rf ] + siE(SMB) + hiE(HML) + εi,
where E(Ri) is the monthly return on the IPO portfolio, Rf is the 1-month Treasury bill rate,
E(RM) is the monthly return on a value-weighted market portfolio of Euronext stocks, E(SMB)
is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the
Euronext median), and E(HML) is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high-
book-to-market and low-book-to-market stocks (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles of the
book-to-market ratios).
Second, we used an event-time approach, as in the study of Brav and Gompers (1997). Fama
and French (1992, 1993) have shown that the size and book-to-market portfolios are important
determinants of the cross section of stock returns. We compared the performance of IPOs with
that of the size and book-to-market portfolios. Starting in January 1991, we used all Euronext
stocks to create size quartile breakpoints with an equal number of firms in each size quartile.
Size was measured by the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end
of the preceding month. The monthly book-to-market data were extracted from the Amadeus
database for each firm. Within each size quartile, we created four book-to-market portfolios with
an equal number of firms in each book-to-market quartile, resulting in 16 size and book-to-market
portfolios. Equally weighted returns were calculated for each portfolio. To avoid comparing IPO
firms with themselves, we eliminated IPO firms from the various portfolios for 5 years after their
equity issue. Each issue was matched with its corresponding benchmark portfolio.
The long-run performance was calculated using the BHAR methodology.
The difference between a return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm and the return
on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate expected return (BHAR) is
BHARit =
τ∏
t=1
[1 + Rit] −
τ∏
t=1
[1 + E(Rit)],
where Rit is defined as the month t simple return on a sample firm and E(Rit) as the month t
expected return for the sample firm (i.e. the return of firm i’s benchmark over the same period).
3.2 Data and sample statistics
Three types of variables were used in this study.
• Ex ante IPO variables (venture capital, shares offered, underwriters, etc.) were obtained from
the SDC Platinum database. Our sample contained 270 IPOs that were issued in France over the
1991–2005 period. We included all the IPOs, with the exception of transfers from one market
to another. IPOs that conducted a seasoned equity offerings (SEO) within 5 years of the IPO
date or IPOs that were delisted within 3 years of the IPO date were also excluded.
• The ex post IPO variables were focused on the recommendations made by the financial analysts.
These recommendations were obtained from the analyst-by-analyst I/B/E/S historical earnings
estimate database. I/B/E/S provided us with 6760 recommendations since 1993 until 2004.
• The long-run performance was calculated using the Datastream monthly stock price database.
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3.2.1 Ex ante variables and the long-run performance of IPOs
• VC affiliation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture capitalists are affiliated with IPOs at the
time of the offering and 0 otherwise. As in the study of Brav and Gompers (1997), we expected
a negative coefficient.
• Bookbuilding method is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOs are book built. Previous
studies have found that book-built issues were more likely to be covered. We expected a positive
coefficient.
• Tech firm is a dummy variable equal to 1 if IPO firms are technology firms and 0 otherwise.
Most of the technology firms in our sample went public during the internet bubble, a period
with strong uncertainty and aberrant pricing behaviour (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). We
expected a negative coefficient.
• Syndicate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of managing underwriters is above
the median level and 0 otherwise. Corwin and Schultz (2005) found evidence of information
production by syndicate members. In IPOs underwritten by large syndicates, the offer price is
more likely to reflect the true value of the firm. IPOs with a large underwriting syndicate should
outperform the others. We expected the coefficient to be positive.
• Underpricing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an IPO’s initial return is above the median level
and 0 otherwise. Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) found evidence
that IPOs with a significant underpricing underperform other firms; therefore, we expected a
negative coefficient.
3.2.2 Ex post variables and the long-run performance of IPOs
3.2.2.1 The characteristics of financial analysts
• Analyst affiliation is equal to 1 if the financial analyst is affiliated and 0 otherwise. Using a
sample of 391 IPOs in the USA over the period 1990–1991, Michaely and Womack (1999)
found that affiliated analysts’ recommendations performed more poorly than the unaffiliated
analysts’ recommendations (consistent with the findings of Iskoz (2003) and Houston, James,
and Karceski (2006)).Affiliated analysts issue recommendations that are overly optimistic (pos-
itively biased), and these analysts may be compelled to issue more positive recommendations
on firms that have traded poorly in the IPO aftermarket (consistent with the findings of James
and Karceski (2006)). Therefore, if the market is rational, investors should discount affiliated
recommendations compared with unaffiliated ones. We expected the coefficient to be negative.
3.2.2.2 The nature of the recommendations
• Code represents the recommendations made by financial analysts within 5 years of the IPO.
This variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendations and 1, 0, −1, and −2 for ‘buy’, ‘hold’,
‘underperform’, and ‘sell’, respectively. We hypothesise that better (worse) recommendations
have a positive (negative) impact on the long-run performance. We expected the coefficient to
be positive.
• Favourable represents the favourable recommendations made by financial analysts within 5
years of the IPO. This variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendations, 1 for ‘buy’, and 0 for
‘hold’, ‘underperform’, and ‘sell’. We hypothesise that favourable recommendations have a
positive impact on the long-run performance. We expected the coefficient to be positive.
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• Unfavourable represents the unfavourable recommendations made by financial analysts within
5 years of the IPO. This variable is 2 for ‘sell’ recommendations, 1 for ‘underperform’, and 0
for ‘hold’, ‘buy’, and ‘strong buy’. We hypothesise that unfavourable recommendations have a
negative impact on the long-run performance. We expected the coefficient to be negative.
• Initiation is set to 2 for a ‘strong buy’ recommendation and to 1, 0, −1, and −2 for ‘buy’,
‘hold’, ‘underperform’, and ‘sell’, respectively. We expected a positive coefficient.
• Upgrade represents recommendation changes that are upgrades, which are upgrades from ‘sell’
to ‘hold’ or from ‘buy’ to ‘strong buy’, for example. It takes the value of 2 for a ‘strong buy’
recommendation and those of 1, 0, and −1 for ‘buy’, ‘hold’, and ‘underperform’, respectively.
We expected a positive coefficient.
• Downgrade reflects recommendation changes that are downgrades (from ‘strong buy’ to ‘buy’
or from ‘hold’ to ‘sell’, for example). It is set to 2 for a ‘sell’ recommendation and to 1, 0, and
−1 for ‘underperform’, ‘hold’, and ‘buy’, respectively. We expected a negative coefficient.
3.2.2.3 The strength of recommendations We tested the interaction between the characteristics
of the analysts (whether they are affiliated) and the nature of their recommendations. Six vari-
ables were used: Aff*Code, Aff*Favourable, Aff*Unfavourable, Aff*Initiation, Aff*Upgrade, and
Aff*Downgrade.
3.2.2.4 Control variables
• Non-orphan is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an IPO has analyst coverage and 0 otherwise.
• Dispersion serves as a control variable for dispersion of recommendations. It represents the
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of analysts’ recommendations within 1, 3, and 5
years of the IPO. We interpret this variable as a proxy for differences in opinion about a stock.
A larger Dispersion value indicates more strong uncertainty that can lead investors to make
irrational choices. We suppose that dispersed analysts’recommendations have a negative impact
on the long-run performance. Therefore, we expected a negative coefficient.
• Coverage is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the coverage number is above the median
level and 0 otherwise. Das, Guo, and Zhang (2006) and Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003)
found a positive relationship between the coverage number and subsequent performance. We
expected a positive coefficient.
• Size was set to 1 for small, 2 for medium, and 3 for large firms. There is a strong size effect on
performance, even when using methodologies that control for size. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers
(2000) found that after dividing their sample into three size groups, underperformance was
much larger for small firms. We expected a positive coefficient.
• As done in the study of Jain and Kini (1994), we measured the changes in operating perfor-
mance, such as Return on assets, Asset turnover, Sales, and Capital expenditure. The growth
in these measures may provide an explanation for the underperformance experienced by IPOs
5 years after going public. The changes in operating performance were measured 1, 3, and 5
years after the IPO date. Return on assets is the operating income before depreciation and taxes
divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 13 divided by data item 6). Asset turnover is
sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12) divided by total assets. Sales represent gross sales after cash
discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances. Capital expenditure (COMPU-
STAT data item 128) is the cash outflow or funds used for additions to the company’s property,
plant, and equipment, excluding funds used for acquisitions.
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• Trading volume represents the natural logarithm of the average number of IPO shares traded
the first month following the offering.
• Intangibles represents the natural logarithm of the assets not having physical existence during
the year of the issuance.
• Institutional investors is the percentage of the shares held by investors who hold 5% or more
of the outstanding shares at the time of the offering.
Three multivariate regression models were used to estimate the effects of analysts’ recommenda-
tions on the long-run performance. Model 1 considers all the recommendations, whereas Model 2
distinguishes between favourable and unfavourable recommendations. The rationale behind this
distinction is that the market can asymmetrically react to favourable news and unfavourable news
(Cooper, Day, and Lewis 2001; Jegadeesh and Kim 2006; Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008a).
As in previous studies, Model 3 assumes that initiation, upgrade, or downgrade conveys more
information than the value of the recommendation itself (Irvine 2003; Jegadeesh et al. 2004).
Model 1:
BHAR = α + β1Analyst affiliation + β2Code + β3Aff*Code + β4Dispersion + β5Coverage +
β6Size + β7Tech firm + β8Bookbuilding method + β9Syndicate + β10Underpricing + β11VC
affiliation + β12Return on asset + β13Asset turnover + β14Sales + β15Capital expenditure +
γt + ε
Model 2:
BHAR = α + β1Analyst affiliation + β2Favourable + β3Unfavourable + β4Aff*Favourable +
β5Aff*Unfavourable + β6Dispersion + β7Coverage + β8size + β9Tech firm +β10Bookbuilding
method + β11Syndicate +β12Underpricing +β13VC affiliation +β14Return on asset +β15Asset
turnover + β16Sales + β17Capital expenditure + γt + ε
Model 3:
BHAR = α + β1Analyst affiliation + β2Initiation + β3Upgrade + β4Downgrade + β5Aff*Ini-
tiation + β6Aff*Upgrade + β7Aff*Downgrade + β8Dispersion + β9Coverage + β10Size + β11
Tech firm + β12Bookbuiliding method + β13Syndicate + β14Underpricing + β15VC affiliation
+ β16Return on asset + β17Asset turnover + β18Sales + β19Capital expenditure + γt + ε,
where α is the intercept, γt is the year fixed effects, and ε is the usual error term.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the orphan and non-orphan IPOs. There are 98
IPOs classified as orphan and 172 IPOs classified as non-orphan. The average orphan raised
174.1¤ million in its IPO compared with 215¤ million raised by the average non-orphan. This
difference was statistically significant at the 5% level as indicated by the non-parametric tests.
Consistent with prior research, analyst coverage increased with firm size. Age did not differ
significantly between the non-orphan and orphan IPOs, and the long-term debt of the non-orphan
IPOs was higher than that of the orphan IPOs (the difference was significant at the 10% level as
indicated by the w test). We found no significant difference between the orphans and non-orphans
in venture capital backing. Unlike Degeorge, Derrien, and Womack (2007), we did not find the
bookbuilding method to promote the issuing company through more positive research coverage.
Orphan status was associated with less syndicate underwriting, with a mean of 1.96 managing
underwriters for orphans and that of 3.14 for non-orphans. According to previous studies, a
large underwriting syndicate attracts analyst coverage (a statistically significant effect at the 1%
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Orphan Non-orphan t w
Panel A: orphan versus non-orphan over the 1991–2005 period
IPO 98 172
AGE 19 (10) 21 (13) 0.7 1.4
LONG TERM DEBT 41.2 (3.5) 47.5 (6) 0.3 1.6∗
SIZE 174.1 (42.1) 215 (54.3) 0.6 1.9∗∗
VC AFFILIATION 18.28% 12.79% −1.2 −1.2
BOOKBUILDING METHOD 61.2% 69.2% 1.3 1.3
UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE 1.96 3.14 3∗∗∗ 3.6∗∗∗
UNDERPRICING 5.75% 11.14% 1.1 0.9
Notes: The characteristics of orphans versus non-orphans are reported. An orphan (non-orphan) means an IPO without
analyst coverage (with analyst coverage). IPO is the number of the issuing firm. AGE is the age of the issuing firm at the
time of the offer in years. LONG TERM DEBT represents all interest-bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts
due within 1 year at the offering date in millions. SIZE is the market capitalisation at the offering date in millions. VC
AFFILIATION is the percentage of firms that are affiliated to venture capitalists. BOOKBUILDING METHOD is the
percentage of firms that are book built. UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE is the number of managing underwriters (lead
plus co-managers). UNDERPRICING is the percentage difference between the close on the first day of trading and the
offer price. Medians are given within the parentheses. Student’s parametric (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non-parametric test
were used to determine whether the difference between the sample distributions was statistically significant.
∗Significant difference at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant difference at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant difference at the 1% level.
level). There is no relationship between analyst coverage and underpricing. For example, orphans
have initial returns of 5.75% compared with 11.14% for non-orphans. Non-orphans are more
underpriced than orphans, but the difference is not statistically significant. Finally, neither orphans
nor non-orphans are concentrated in a particular industry or period (results not reported here).
4. Results
4.1 Long-run performance of IPOs
In this section, we report the findings related to the performance of newly public firms over the 5-
year horizon. Two methodologies were chosen in this study: the size and book-to-market-adjusted
BHAR, as in the study of Brav and Gompers (1997), and the Fama–French three-factor model.
4.1.1 The event-time approach
Table 2 (PanelA) shows that French IPOs have statistically significant long-run underperformance
over a 3- to 5-year horizon. IPOs have mean performances ranging from −28.85% over the 3
years following their offerings to −68.10% over the 5-year horizon (both the t and w tests were
statistically significant at the 1% level). It is worth noting that the 12-month performances of
French IPOs over the entire period showed a positive abnormal return.
Consistent with the findings of Degeorge and Derrien (2001), in the 1991–1998 period, we
found French IPOs to have, on average, no abnormal performance over a 3-year horizon. Once
we extended the horizon to 4 years after the issuance, the IPOs exhibited an underperformance
that was statistically significant at the1% level as indicated by both the t and w tests. This result
was confirmed by the 60-month performances.
Similar to Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), as shown in Panel B, we found the underperfor-
mance over the entire period to be much greater for smaller firms than for larger firms. Many studies
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Table 2. Long-run performance of IPOs.
1991–1998 1999–2000 2001–2005 1991–2005
Panel A Mean t W Mean t w Mean t w Mean t w
BHAR 60 −61.76% −4∗∗∗ −6.7∗∗∗ −80.26% −2.7∗∗∗ −6.6∗∗∗ −56.34% −2.7∗∗∗ −2.5∗∗∗ −68.10% −5.4∗∗∗ −9.8∗∗∗
(−75.11%) (−100.06%) (−27.04%) (−85.62%)
BHAR 48 −51.18% −3.9∗∗∗ −5.4∗∗∗ −59.17% −3.2∗∗∗ −6.5∗∗∗ −41.44% −2∗∗ −2.7∗∗∗ −52.78% −5.8∗∗∗ −8.8∗∗∗
(−71.26%) (−77.98%) (−34.42%) (−71.53%)
BHAR 36 −18.52% −1.3 −3.9∗∗∗ −40.34% −2.8∗∗∗ −5.1∗∗∗ −35.31% −3.8∗∗∗ −3.3∗∗∗ −28.85% −3.1∗∗∗ −7.2∗∗∗
(−50.30%) (−58.39%) (−26.49%) (−53.57%)
BHAR 24 8.92% 0.7 −1.8∗ −29.02% −1.9∗∗ −4.2∗∗∗ −17.26% −2.2∗∗ −2.1∗∗ −8.62% −1 −4.9∗∗∗
(−30.27%) (−59.13%) (−18.01%) (−35.44%)
BHAR 12 16.36% 2.9∗∗∗ 1.1 15.48% 1 −1.3 −11.45% −2.2∗∗ −1.9∗∗ 11.02% 1.9∗∗ −1
(−3.93%) (−22.41%) (−5.47%) (−9.23%)
Panel B S M B S M B S M B S M B
BHAR 60 −77.84% −80.03% −32.86% −111.97% −79.41% −57.28% −67.20% −65.96% −8.95% −93.42% −78.92% −35.98%
F 5.5∗∗∗ 4.4∗∗∗ 1.3 11.3∗∗∗
BHAR 48 −85.92% −63.36% −26.52% −77.31% −61.13% −35.17% −79.60% −46.05% −26.27% −81.10% −60.36% −28.45%
F 5.5∗∗∗ 2.2 1.2 9.4∗∗∗
BHAR 36 −80.86% −41.22% −112.7% −61.41% −47.73% 9.85% −57.05% −36.03% −17.31% −68.56% −42.63% −7.74%
F 6.8∗∗∗ 6.1∗∗∗ 0.9 12.7∗∗∗
BHAR 24 −58.53% −19.46% 0.6% −27.89% −44.60% −16.99% −119.56% −146.15% −0.35% −38.35% −27.20% −3.95%
F 4.2∗∗∗ 1.4 0.3 4.4∗∗∗
BHAR 12 −30.34% 4.39% 11.37% 3.44% −7.86% −3.30% −44.59% −9.66% 5.27% −22.03% −1.96% 6.74%
F 3.7∗∗ 0.1 2.8∗ 3∗∗
Notes: The long-run BHARs over the 12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 60-month performances are reported. Panel A shows the 270 French IPOs made between 1991 and 2005. Bootstrapped
skewness-adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non-parametric test were used to estimate whether the BHAR was statistically significant. Panel B distinguishes IPOs by size. S, M,
and B indicate, respectively, small, medium, and big IPOs measured by their market capitalisation at the time of the issuance. The Bartlett (F) test for equal variances was used
to estimate whether the differences between IPO sizes were significant. Medians are given within the parentheses.
∗Significant difference at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant difference at 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant difference at the 1% level.
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Table 3. The Fama–French three-factor model. E(Ri) − Rf = αi + βi[E(Rm) − Rf ] + siE(SMB) +
hiE(HML) + εi.
1991–1998 1999–2000 2001–2003 2004–2007
130 IPOs 218 IPOs 241 IPOs 270 IPOs
αi −0.001 (−0.1) −0.015 (−3.1)∗∗∗ −0.007 (−1.7)∗ −0.003 (−2.3)∗∗
βi 1.245 (13.4)∗∗∗ 1.836 (7.2)∗∗∗ 1.480 (6.9)∗∗∗ 1.298 (27)∗∗∗
si −0.073 (−0.4) 0.672 (3.2)∗∗∗ −0.072 (−0.4) −0.047 (−0.6)
hi −0.081 (−0.7) −0.895 (−5.4)∗∗∗ −0.265 (−1.3) −0.059 (−0.7)
R2 0.70 0.91 0.89 0.96
Notes: The results obtained using the calendar-time approach based on IPO waves are reported. The years 1991–1998
and 2001–2003 are the cold market periods, whereas the years 1999–2000 and 2004–2007 are the hot market periods.
Coefficient estimates are also reported (with t-statistics given within the parentheses).
have revealed that small firms are covered by fewer analysts. Therefore, this underperformance
associated with the absence of analyst coverage may be due to a size effect.
4.1.2 The calendar-time approach
We also calculated the long-run performance using the Fama–French three-factor model. The
regression yielded parameter estimates for αi, βi, si, and hi. The parameter of interest in this
regression was the intercept, αi. A negative intercept indicates that after controlling for the market,
size, and book-to-market factors in returns, a sample firm performed worse than expected. We
used a calendar-time approach based on IPO waves. The heteroscedasticity-corrected results are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the intercept (αi) is negative over the four waves. The number of IPOs is
cumulative across the sub-periods. In the 1991–1998 period, for example, there were 130 new
issues, and over the 1999–2000 period, there were 130 IPOs (those introduced between 1991 and
1998) plus 88 new issues (those introduced between 1999 and 2000).The IPOs tended to perform
worse than expected. The intercept was statistically significant during the hot market periods,
meaning that underperformance was concentrated in this period (the effect was significant at
the 1% level during the internet bubble). Over the 2001–2003 and 2004–2007 periods, αi was
statistically significant at conventional levels, which indicates that older IPOs (IPOs that went
public in the 1990s) explain the abnormal long-run returns in the 2000s.
4.2 Long-run performance of orphan versus non-orphan IPOs
We now distinguish IPOs according to financial analyst coverage. The findings are reported in
Table 4. Panel A shows that orphan and non-orphan IPOs have statistically significant long-
run underperformance over the 2–5-year horizons (as confirmed at the 1% level by both the
t and w tests). We found a significant difference between the long-run underperformances of
orphan and non-orphan IPOs within the first year of the offering. The 12-month performance
showed the analysts’ ability to predict the long-run performance before the disclosure of financial
statements.At the time of the IPO, investors are limited to the material information contained in the
prospectus, and informational asymmetries are particularly high. It is worth noting that in the first
year following the offering, there is no abnormal performance exhibited by the non-orphans (an
average of 4.29%, t = 0.9). In the first 12 months following their offerings, the orphans exhibited
an underperformance of −11.41%, whereas the non-orphans exhibited a performance of 4.29%.
This 15.7% difference was significant at the 5% level in both the t and w tests.
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Table 4. Long-run performance of orphans versus non-orphans over the 1991–2005 period.
Orphan IPOs Non-orphan IPOs
Panel A N Mean Median t w N Mean Median t w t w
BHAR 60 63 −73.23% −84.16% −6.3∗∗∗ −5.9∗∗∗ 150 −79.33% −89.17% −10.1∗∗∗ −9.6∗∗∗ −0.6 −0.6
BHAR 48 69 −67.26% −78.08% −6.3∗∗∗ −6.4∗∗∗ 155 −56.07% −70.26% −7.3∗∗∗ −8∗∗∗ 1.4 0.9
BHAR 36 83 −47.16% −57.04% −4.4∗∗∗ −5.9∗∗∗ 153 −35.42% −51.06% −5.1∗∗∗ −6.1∗∗∗ 1.4 1.3
BHAR 24 95 −30.17% −45.61% −3.8∗∗∗ −5∗∗∗ 146 −16.53% −29.45% −2.8∗∗∗ −3.6∗∗∗ 1.7∗ 1.3
BHAR 12 113 −11.41% −16.53% −2.3∗∗ −3.2∗∗∗ 126 4.29% −2% 0.9 0.4 2.3∗∗ 2.1∗∗
Orphan IPOs Non-orphan IPOs Yes No
Venture capital affiliation
Panel B Yes No T w Yes No t w t w t w
BHAR 60 −68.43% −98.70% 1.4 1.2 −78.69% −84.02% 0.4 0.3 −0.9 −0.9 0.6 0.6
BHAR 48 −61.32% −98.60% 2.2∗∗ 1.9∗∗ −58.11% −43.77% −0.9 −1 0.3 0.1 2.6∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗
BHAR 36 −47.11% −47.41% 0.1 0.4 −36.27% −30.31% −0.3 −0.1 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.8
BHAR 24 −27.82% −40.93% 0.8 0.8 −16.82% −14.55% −0.1 −0.2 1.3 0.8 1.1 1.3
BHAR 12 −9.18% −22.41% 1.1 1.3 7.31% −13.81% 1.6 1.5 2.2∗∗ 2.1∗∗ 0.5 0.4
Orphan IPOs Non-orphan IPOs Yes No
Bookbuilding method
Panel C Yes No T w Yes No t w t w t w
BHAR 60 −95.08% −47.63% 2.6∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ −88.95% −58.26% 2.4∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗ 0.5 0.8 −0.7 −0.7
BHAR 48 −87.72% −42.19% 3.3∗∗∗ 3.2∗∗∗ −67.84% −28.18% 3∗∗∗ 2.7∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗ 1.9∗∗ 0.9 0.5
BHAR 36 −58.12% −30.56% 1.9∗∗ 2.3∗∗ −47.84% −4.64% 3.3∗∗∗ 3.5∗∗∗ 1 1.1 1.7∗ 1.8∗
BHAR 24 −43.92% −6.59% 3∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ −33.25% 16.56% 4.1∗∗∗ 4∗∗∗ 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.3
BHAR 12 −18.99% 0.05% 2.1∗∗ 2.8∗∗∗ −3.28% 20.01% 2.2∗∗ 2.4∗∗∗ 1.8∗ 1.6 2∗∗ 1.9∗
Underwriting syndicate Large Low
Panel D Large Low T w Large Low t w t w t w
BHAR 60 −76.59% −84.74% 0.4 0.4 −80.69% −83.73% 0.3 0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.1 0.1
BHAR 48 −80.36% −76.40% −0.2 0.2 −60.23% −57.46% −0.2 0.1 1.5 1 1.6 1.5
BHAR 36 −46.86% −51.35% 0.3 0.2 −27.57% −42.63% 1.3 1.1 1.1 1 0.8 0.9
BHAR 24 −42.58% −25.29% −1.2 −1.1 −19.84% −13.38% −0.6 −0.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.7
BHAR 12 −19.67% −5.44% −1.2 −1.2 6.53% 1.79% 0.4 0.4 2∗∗ 1.7∗ 0.8 0.7
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Underpricing High Low
Panel E High Low T w High Low t w t w t w
BHAR 60 −63.14% −94.82% 1.7∗ 1.6∗ −67.36% −84.03% 1.3 1 −0.3 −0.3 0.8 0.7
BHAR 48 −53.04% −89.34% 2.5∗∗∗ 1.7∗ −45.46% −63.55% 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.5 2.4∗∗∗ 1.6∗
BHAR 36 −40.37% −56.62% 1.2 1 −32.83% −35.75% 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.6∗
BHAR 24 −21.26% −36.64% 1.2 0.6 −16.82% −22.26% 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.7
BHAR 12 −5.97% −19.66% 1.4 1.8∗ 6.88% −0.91% 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.7∗ 1.6∗
Notes: The long-run performance of French IPOs classified as orphan IPOs (without analyst coverage) and non-orphan IPOs (with analyst coverage) is reported. Panel A focuses
on analyst coverage, whereas Panels B, C, D, and E partition orphans and non-orphans by other characteristics. Panel B distinguishes orphans and non-orphans by venture capital
affiliation. Yes and no mean venture capital-backed IPOs and non-venture capital-backed IPOs, respectively. Panel C distinguishes orphans and non-orphans by underwriting
syndicate. Number of managers above the median level is classified as big; otherwise small. Panel D partitions orphan IPOs and non-orphan IPOs by underpricing where IPOs
that have underpricing above the median level are classified as high; otherwise low. Panel C distinguishes orphan and non-orphan IPOs by the bookbuilding method. Yes and no
mean book-built issues or non-book-built issues, respectively. Panel D distinguishes orphans and non-orphans by underwriting syndicate. Number of managers above the median
level is classified as large; otherwise low. Panel E partitions orphan IPOs and non-orphan IPOs by underpricing where IPOs that have underpricing above the median level are
classified as high; otherwise low. Long-run performance is computed as the BHARs over the 12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 60-month performances. Bootstrapped skewness-adjusted (t)
test and Wilcoxon (w) non-parametric test were used to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between the sample distributions was statistically significant. The returns
were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels.
∗Significant difference at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant difference at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant difference at the 1% level.
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Hypothesis H1, which posits that non-orphan IPOs may have long-run performance that is
superior to that of the orphan IPOs, was confirmed for the first year of floatation.
After the first year of floatation, however, the differences between the long-run performance
of orphan and non-orphan IPOs were no longer significant. This change may be due to some
endogeneity between firm performance and the analysts’ recommendations. Indeed, firms pub-
lish their financial statements after the first year of floatation, which can influence the analysts’
recommendations. Therefore, analysts’ recommendations are linked to past performance for a
short time.
Venture capital affiliation, the bookbuilding method, underwriting syndication, and underpric-
ing have been shown to influence the long-run performance of IPOs. Therefore, if there is a
relationship between analyst coverage and long-run performance, it may be a manifestation
of these variables. We investigated these potential relationships by focusing on each of them
separately.
The results of venture capital affiliation are presented in Panel B. We partitioned our sample
by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, indicating venture capital-backed IPOs or non-venture capital-backed IPOs,
respectively. We found no significant difference in the long-run performance between venture
capital-backed IPOs and non-venture capital-backed IPOs that receive analyst coverage. This
result holds for the orphan IPOs except for the 48-month performance. Interestingly, there was
a statistically significant difference in the 12-month performance between the venture capital-
backed orphan IPOs and the venture capital-backed non-orphan IPOs (−9.18% versus 7.31%).
This difference may be attributable to the crucial role of financial analysts.
From Panel C, it can be seen that firms that conduct an IPO using the bookbuilding method
exhibit poorer long-run performance than firms introduced by an auction-like or a fixed-price
method. For example, non-orphan IPOs with a book-built issue have a 48-month performance
of −67.84% compared with −87.72% for orphan IPOs with a book-built issue. The difference
was statistically significant. Non-orphan IPOs that were not conducted by a bookbuilding method
had a 1-year performance of 20.01% compared with 0.05% for their orphan IPO counterparts.
These results suggest that financial analysts help investors to progressively define the true value
of the firm.
From Panel D, we can see that non-orphan IPOs with large underwriting syndicates (IPOs in
which the number of managing underwriters is above the median level are classified as ‘large’;
otherwise, they are classified as ‘low’) outperform orphan IPOs, particularly in the first year
following the IPO. The performance of non-orphan IPOs with a large underwriting syndicate is
6.53% compared with −19.67% for orphan IPOs with a large underwriting syndicate. The 26.2%
difference was significant at conventional levels in both the tand w tests. Hence, the market pays
more attention to analyst coverage when the underwriting syndicate is large.
As has been discussed above, prior studies have found a positive relationship between under-
pricing and analyst coverage. We expected IPOs with high underpricing to be associated with
analyst coverage. In Panel A, we can see a positive relationship between analyst coverage and
long-run performance. Thus, the results given in Panel A indirectly imply a positive relationship
between underpricing and long-run performance, findings that are inconsistent with the evidence
reported by Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). Unlike these studies,
Panel E shows that highly underpriced orphan IPOs (IPOs with underpricing above the median
level are classified as ‘high’; otherwise, they are classified as ‘low’) outperform less underpriced
orphan IPOs over the 48- and 60-month horizons (the difference was statistically significant in
both the t and w tests). Non-orphan IPOs with less underpricing outperform orphans with less
underpricing over the 1- and 4-year horizons. The differences were significant at conventional
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levels in both the t and w tests. Finally, there were no long-run performance differences between
the orphan and non-orphan highly underpriced IPOs. Hence, analyst coverage has investment
value only for the less underpriced IPOs.
In summary, these findings suggest that investors and market participants pay attention to
analyst coverage when IPOs are venture capital backed, are not introduced by the bookbuilding
method, have a large underwriting syndicate, and are less underpriced.
Next, we investigated the characteristics of analyst coverage by distinguishing the coverage
number and the affiliation of the financial analysts. Numerous studies have documented a positive
relationship between the coverage number and the subsequent short- and long-run performance
(Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2003; Das, Guo, and Zhang 2006). These findings are reported in
Table 5. Panel A indicates that IPOs with high coverage (those with a coverage number above the
median level are classified as ‘high’; otherwise, they are classified as ‘low’) perform better than
IPOs with low coverage from 4 to 5 years after the IPO date (a difference that was statistically
significant).
As shown in Panel B, we tested the conflict of interest hypothesis (H3) by conditioning for
the financial analyst affiliation. IPOs covered by affiliated analysts do not underperform those
covered by unaffiliated analysts. This result is inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis,
but supports our hypothesis H3c, which posits that there may be no difference in the announcement
effects between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations because the market is naïve about the
differential conflicts of interest.
To verify that the univariate results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are robust in a multivariate
setting, we report two OLS regression models in Table 6. We found non-orphan IPOs and analyst
coverage to be positively and significantly related to long-run performance only over the 12-month
horizon, which is broadly consistent with the univariate analysis results given in Table 4. Both the
bookbuilding method and size explain a significant component of the long-run IPO performance
whatever the horizon we considered. The other variables (such as underpricing and underwriting
syndicate) fail to explain the long-run performance of French IPOs.
Model B differs from Model A by considering variables such as the trading volume, intangi-
bles, and the presence of institutional investors that are known to influence analyst coverage but
not the long-run performance (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Barth, Kasznik, and
McNichols 2001). Table 6 shows that these variables are not related to the long-run performance
of French IPOs.
4.3 Determinants of the long-run performance
We established that the firms going public in the 1991–2005 period had long-run abnormal under-
performance. Moreover, part of this underperformance can be attributed to ex ante variables, such
as the bookbuilding method and the size of the IPO.
Next, we investigated whether the ex post variables can explain the abnormal performance. We
studied the relationship between long-run performance and a variety of variables that were known
to investors at the time of the offering (industry, shares offered, underwriters, venture capital
backing, etc.) or occurring within 5 years of the IPO date (specifically, the financial analysts’
recommendations). The null hypothesis of market efficiency predicts that all these variables are
correctly estimated and hence cannot explain the long-run performance. An alternative hypothesis
is that some variables are systematically overvalued or undervalued and can impact the long-run
performance.
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Table 5. Long-run performance based on analyst coverage and affiliation.
Low coverage High coverage
Panel A Mean Median t w Mean Median t w t w
BHAR 60 −94.37% −100.06% −9.4∗∗∗ −7.8∗∗∗ −69.44% −73.52% −7.1∗∗∗ −6.5∗∗∗ 2.5∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗
BHAR 48 −70.49% −80.14% −5.5∗∗∗ −7∗∗∗ −47.24% −61.76% −4.4∗∗∗ −4.9∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗ 2.1∗∗
BHAR 36 −43.29% −58.09% −4∗∗∗ −5.4∗∗∗ −30.13% −36.90% −3.6∗∗∗ −3.8∗∗∗ 1.2 1.5
BHAR 24 −18.69% −38.53% −2.4∗∗∗ −2.8∗∗∗ −20.18% −29.65% −2.7∗∗∗ −3.3∗∗∗ −0.2 0.3
BHAR 12 4.61% −6.91% 0.7 0.1 0.14% −5.76% 0.1 −0.2 −0.5 −0.2
Affiliated Unaffiliated
Panel B Mean Median t w Mean Median t w t w
BHAR 60 −81.61% −91.90% −5.9∗∗∗ −6.4∗∗∗ −74.69% −82.38% −8∗∗∗ −7.2∗∗∗ 0.3 0.7
BHAR 48 −60.04% −71.11% −6∗∗∗ −6.2∗∗∗ −52.53% −68.97% −4.6∗∗∗ −5.2∗∗∗ 0.7 0.2
BHAR 36 −40.27% −53.99% −4.1∗∗∗ −4.8∗∗∗ −30.87% −44.55% −3.2∗∗∗ −3.8∗∗∗ 0.8 0.7
BHAR 24 −22.43% −42.44% −2.5∗∗∗ −3.3∗∗∗ −10.29% −26.30% −1.2 −1.7∗ 1.1 1
BHAR 12 6.17% 0.5% 0.8 0.5 2.59% −5.7% 0.4 0.1 −0.4 −0.4
Notes: The long-run performance of French IPOs covered by financial analysts are reported. Panel A distinguishes IPOs with high coverage (where the number of analysts is
above the median level) and IPOs with low coverage (where the number of analysts is below the median level).Panel B partitions analysts by affiliation where analysts whose
employer is a managing underwriter are classified as affiliated, else unaffiliated. Long-run performance is computed as the BHARs over the 12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 60-month
performances. Bootstrapped skewness-adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non-parametric test were used to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between the sample
distributions was statistically significant. The returns were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels.
∗Significant difference at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant difference at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant difference at the 1% level.
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Table 6. Cross-sectional regressions of the long-run performance of IPOs over the 1991–2005 period.
BHAR 60 BHAR 36 BHAR 12
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B
Intercept −1.252∗∗∗ −1.589∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗ −0.406
Non-orphan 0.043 0.025 0.285 0.248 0.423∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
VC affiliation −0.059 −0.108 0.077 0.053 −0.104 −0.081
Bookbuilding method −0.250∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗
Syndicate −0.010 −0.037 0.111 0.095 0.049 0.057
Underpricing 0.162 0.118 0.033 0.038 0.068 0.120∗
Size 0.292∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.187
Coverage −0.090 −0.137 −0.159 −0.151 −0.277∗∗ −0.258∗∗
Analyst affiliation 0.017 0.001 −0.076 −0.092 0.140 0.134
Volume information 0.103 0.012 −0.118
Intangibles 0.177 0.176 −0.037
Institutional investors 0.089 0.066 0.023
F 5∗∗∗ 3.2∗∗∗ 7.2∗∗∗ 5∗∗∗ 3.4∗∗∗ 2.6∗∗∗
Note: The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold abnormal return. Fisher statistics (F) appear to estimate whether the
models are significant or not.
∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 10% level using Student’s t-statistics.
∗∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 5% level using Student’s t-statistics.
∗∗∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 1% level using Student’s t-statistics.
The dependent variable in the regression will be the long-run performance of French IPOs, as
determined by the BHARs over 1, 3, and 5 years. As Bradley et al. (2008b) noted, a common over-
sight in examining analysts’ recommendations is the endogenous problem between performance
and analyst coverage. That is, the quality of an IPO is slowly revealed to the public through finan-
cial statements and other public sources after it has been issued. Therefore, other savvy investors
could have predicted the long-run IPO performance. The analysts may just be jumping on the
bandwagon when information is generated by other sources, such as financial statements. Our
research model overcomes this pitfall by calculating the BHARs for each recommendation’s date.
Table 7 reports our regression results (corrected for heteroscedasticity and multicollinear-
ity). We used a 2SLS regression model to take into account the endogenous problem (the more
valuable firms would likely attract more analysts). The coverage variable was endogenous, and
we used instrument variables, such as trading volume, intangibles, and institutional investors,
that are known to influence analyst coverage but not the long-run performance (as reported in
Table 6). Our three models were statistically significant and explained the long-run performance
of French IPOs.
Table 7 shows that the nature of the recommendations is not related to long-run performance over
the 5- and 3-year horizons. This finding may imply that investors fully incorporate the information
contained in the recommendations at the time of the offering. This finding is consistent with the
study of Bradley et al. (2008b). Analyst coverage has a negative impact on IPO firm performance
over the 5-year horizon. This result may explain why market participants pay no attention to the
nature of the recommendations over this horizon.
During the investigation the first year following the issue, we found the Code, Favourable,
Unfavourable, Initiation, Upgrade, and Downgrade variables to be significantly related to
long-run performance, as we hypothesised. ‘Strong buy’ and ‘buy’ (‘underperform’ and ‘sell’)
recommendations were positively (negatively) related to long-run performance. Hence, the
recommendations have investment value, and hypothesis H2 that posits an association between
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Table 7. Determinants of the long-run performance of non-orphans over the 1991–2005 period.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
5491 observations (174 IPO firms)
Intercept −1.437∗∗∗ −1.445∗∗∗ −1.448∗∗∗
Analyst affiliation −0.038 −0.021 −0.129
Code −0.027
Favourable −0.024
Unfavourable 0.026
Initiation −0.012
Upgrade 0.007
Downgrade −0.101∗∗
Aff∗Code −0.057
Aff∗Favourable −0.055
Aff∗Unfavourable 0.039
Aff∗Initiation 0.032
Aff∗Upgrade 0.103
Aff∗Downgrade −0.158
Dispersion 0.178 0.147 0.176
Coverage −2.458∗∗ −2.317∗ −2.463∗∗
Size 1.195∗∗ 1.144∗∗ 1.193∗∗
Tech firm −0.614∗∗∗ −0.610∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗
Bookbuilding method 0.161 0.164 0.158
Syndicate −0.334 −0.330 −0.327
Underpricing −0.068 −0.058 −0.076
VC affiliation 0.541∗ 0.509 0.547∗
Return on asset 0.020 0.020 0.021
Asset turnover 0.118 0.131 0.122
Sales −0.028 −0.030 −0.028
Capital expenditure 0.160∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
1993 0.524 0.633 0.589
1994 0.893∗ 0.928∗ 0.891∗
1995 0.492 0.508 0.492
1996 0.211 0.220 0.200
1997 0.248 0.257 0.249
1998 0.135 0.142 0.139
1999 0.138 0.142 0.137
2000 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
2001 0.071 0.071 0.072
2002 – – –
2003 – – –
2004 – – –
6724 observations (202 IPO firms)
Intercept 0.555 0.731 0.614
Analyst affiliation −0.116 −0.166 −0.119
Code 0.022
Favourable 0.010
Unfavourable −0.046
Initiation 0.025
Upgrade 0.041
Downgrade −0.005
Aff∗Code 0.034
(Continued).
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Table 7. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Aff∗Favourable 0.068
Aff∗Unfavourable 0.029
Aff∗Initiation 0.049
Aff∗Upgrade 0.028
Aff∗Downgrade −0.017
Dispersion −0.478 −0.516 −0.500
Coverage 1.868∗ 2.068∗ 1.935∗∗
Size −0.832 −0.943 −0.872
Tech firm −0.067 −0.046 −0.060
Bookbuilding method −0.105 −0.108 −0.107
Syndicate 0.005 −0.006 0.001
Underpricing 0.078 0.064 0.068
VC affiliation −0.050 −0.076 −0.060
Return on asset 0.109∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
Asset turnover 0.019∗ 0.024 0.023∗∗
Sales 0.031 0.037 0.034
Capital expenditure 0.022 0.023 0.022
1993 0.300 0.302 0.312
1994 0.279 0.274 0.276
1995 0.102 0.092 0.095
1996 0.340 0.337 0.0336
1997 0.163 0.153 0.154
1998 −0.272 −0.290 −0.277
1999 −0.274 −0.292 −0.280
2000 −0.135 −0.154 0.138
2001 −0.438∗∗ −0.461∗∗ −0.442∗∗
2002 −0.282 −0.296 −0.285
2003 0.091 0.084 0.085
2004 – – –
6760 observations (203 IPO firms)
Intercept 2.458 2.516 2.372
Analyst affiliation −0.179 −0.193 −0.198
Code 0.066∗∗∗
Favourable 0.066∗∗
Unfavourable −0.070∗∗
Initiation 0.083∗∗
Upgrade 0.050∗∗∗
Downgrade −0.066∗∗
Aff∗Code 0.030
Aff∗Favourable 0.038
Aff∗Unfavourable −0.013
Aff∗Initiation 0.140∗
Aff∗Upgrade 0.023
Aff∗Downgrade 0.024
Dispersion −0.192 −0.194 −0.180
Coverage 1.818 1.872 1.727
Size −1.168 −1.198 −1.110
Tech firm 0.197 0.207 0.176
Bookbuilding method −0.271∗∗ −0.275∗∗ −0.268∗∗
Syndicate −0.116 −0.122 −0.112
Underpricing −0.221 −0.225 −0.228
(Continued).
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Table 7. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VC affiliation −0.418 −0.430 −0.398
Return on asset 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
Asset turnover 0.011∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗
Sales 0.034 0.033 0.035
Capital expenditure 0.119∗ 0.118∗ 0.123∗
1993 −0.565 −0.584 −0.604
1994 −0.547 −0.560 −0.553
1995 −0.592 −0.602 −0.603
1996 −0.632 −0.642 −0.628
1997 −0.254 −0.263 −0.252
1998 −0.537 −0.546 −0.533
1999 −0.165 −0.174 −0.155
2000 −0.315 −0.323 −0.307
2001 −0.578∗∗ −0.587∗∗ −0.567∗∗
2002 −0.594∗∗∗ −0.599∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗
2003 −0.284 −0.288 −0.273
2004 −0.349 −0.358 −0.333
Notes: The dependent variable is the BHAR over a 60-month horizon (5491 observations (174 IPO firms)), a
36-month horizon (6724 observations (202 IPO firms)), and a 12-month horizon (6760 observations (203 IPO
firms)). Observations correspond to analysts’ recommendations. We used the cluster 2SLS regression model.
This specifies that the observations are independent across the groups but not necessarily independent within
the groups. The instrumented variable is coverage. The instrument variables are trading volume, intangibles, and
institutional investors.
∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 10% level using Student’s t-statistics.
∗∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 5% level using Student’s t-statistics.
∗∗∗The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 1% level using Student’s t-statistics.
non-orphan IPO performance and the nature of the recommendations is supported. The coefficient
of Unfavourable (Favourable) was negative (positive); as we expected, unfavourable (favourable)
recommendations were negatively (positively) related to long-run performance (the effect was
significant at the 5% level). Upgrade and Downgrade variables had an impact on the long-run
performance. We found the market reaction to be similar to the changes in the recommendations
than to the value of the recommendations themselves. This result is inconsistent with the evidence
given by Irvine (2003) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004). The characteristics of the financial analysts
are not significant whatever the horizon we considered. We found no difference between affiliated
and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations (except for the initiation by the affiliated analysts).
Therefore, the market seems to be naïve about the differential conflicts of interest, and our H3c
hypothesis was supported. Two explanations may be advanced: (1) there may be no difference in
the announcement effects because, on balance, the more severe conflicts that affiliated analysts
face are offset by their superior information and (2) there may be no difference in the announce-
ment effects because the incentives for unaffiliated analysts to curry favour are so strong that they
face conflicts of interest just as severe as those faced the affiliated analysts.
Finally, our findings show that the results vary from year to year, with no evident-time trend.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we examined the long-run performance of French IPOs issued between 1991 and
2005. Unlike prior studies of the French market, we found the IPOs in our sample to perform
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more poorly than a comparison portfolio over the 1991–2005 horizon. We compared the long-run
performance of firms that did not receive analyst coverage (the orphans) with that of those that did
receive (the non-orphans). This abnormal long-run performance was more severe for orphan IPOs
than for non-orphan IPOs over a 1-year horizon. The evidence suggests that research coverage is
not vital for the long-term success of IPOs, in contrast to the widely held belief. Once we controlled
for other characteristics that have been shown to influence the long-run IPO performance, we found
that investors and market participants pay attention to analyst coverage when the IPOs are venture
capital backed, not introduced using a bookbuilding method, underwritten by a large syndicate,
and not highly underpriced.
The market does not fully incorporate the perceived value of analyst coverage. We found firms
with high coverage to outperform those with low coverage over a 3- to 5-year horizon. Once
we controlled for the affiliation of the analysts making the recommendations, the IPOs covered
by affiliated analysts did not underperform those covered by unaffiliated analysts. This result is
inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis (Michaely and Womack 1999), but supports
our naïve market hypothesis (H3c).
Finally, consistent with the study of Bradley et al. (2008b), multivariate regression analyses
established that the analysts’ recommendations are not related to the 5- or 3-year performances
of IPO firms. Once we focused on the first year after the issuance, however, we found the nature
of the recommendations to be strongly associated with the long-run performance of French IPOs.
Notes
1. It is worth noting that affiliated analysts’ recommendations are viewed as more credible following recent regulatory
reforms (Kadan et al. 2009; Cliff 2007).
2. Derrien (2006) found that security analysts increase their bank’s chance of managing future IPOs when they have
issued generous recommendations to recent IPOs managed by their own bank.
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